The sorry state of the Royal Navy – too small and underfunded
The Royal Navy is in a parlous state, and Britain's failure to deploy forces to defend its bases in Cyprus exposed that to the world
The Royal Navy's weakness exposed by the Iran war
Britain's failure to deploy the Royal Navy to defend its sovereign bases on Cyprus – attacked by Hezbollah drones on 1 March – has raised alarming questions over the readiness of Britain's military to project force overseas, and has shone light in particular on the sorry state of the Senior Service.
On Tuesday, the Type 45 Destroyer HMS Dragon was seen moored in Gibraltar, some 2,200 miles away from its intended destination, after it left Portsmouth last week. It was scheduled to arrive in Cyprus next Monday, some three weeks after the strike by Hezbollah (Iran-sponsored Lebanese militants) on RAF Akrotiri on the southern tip of Cyprus.
There is now no British presence in the Persian Gulf region for the first time in 50 years, and its Cyprus bases are unprotected. According to the former first sea lord, Admiral Lord West of Spithead, it reflects a Royal Navy that's now in its most “parlous state” for 60 years: too small, underfunded, and unable to deliver what the nation needs.
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How big is the Royal Navy?
The Royal Navy fleet is 40% smaller than at the turn of the century and a fraction of the size of 50 years ago. In 1982, it deployed 127 ships for the Falklands conflict, including 43 warships. Today, the navy comprises just 13 principal surface combatants, namely six Type 45 destroyers (the only weapon in the UK's arsenal that can shoot down ballistic missiles) and seven Type 23 frigates. In addition, there are ten submarines, 26 patrol and coastal vessels, and two aircraft carriers.
That's 51 vessels (or “hulls”) in all – a smaller tally than at any point since the mid-17th century, according to James Smith, a war studies researcher at King's College London. And even that number rather overstates the navy's strength, says Larisa Brown in The Times.
In practice, three of six Type 45 destroyers are in deep maintenance and only three are deemed “operational”. Of the seven frigates, only three are operational and neither of the two £3bn aircraft carriers is at sea. In the past three years, both the navy's former amphibious assault ships have been scrapped, as well as five frigates, two minehunters and one attack submarine.
How does the Royal Navy compare to other countries?
The Royal Navy is unusual in that it has relatively few ships, but mostly big ones. In terms of vessel count, Britain is just outside the top ten largest navies (behind the likes of Japan, South Korea, Iran and Italy. China tops this list, ahead of the US).
But in terms of “tonnage” – by most reckonings a better measure of overall capacity and firepower – the Royal Navy ranks fourth, behind the US, China and Russia.
America's navy has 121 vessels in its surface fleet, comprising 11 aircraft carriers, 74 destroyers, 27 frigates and nine cruisers. China has 110 surface combatants, including three carriers, 48 destroyers, 51 frigates and eight cruisers. France's fleet is most similar in size to Britain's, though there's only one aircraft carrier and 17 frigates compared with our seven.
In terms of active personnel, the UK (32,150) now has a smaller navy than France (37,950). The comparable figures for the US is 340,250 and for China, 262,000.
Should the Royal Navy be bigger?
Maritime power remains crucial to protecting British interests, for multiple strategic reasons relating to trade, energy, communications and international alliances. The UK also has sovereignty over 14 overseas territories – stretching from the South Atlantic to the Pacific oceans – three of which neighbour key strategic chokepoints. So a powerful navy is important.
Ultimately, the question of naval power is a fiscal and political choice. If the UK is to meet all its strategic naval objectives – leading Nato against an aggressive Russia; enhancing its contributions to “sea denial” in the Indo-Pacific to dissuade an expansionist China; and protecting international shipping lanes – then yes, a larger navy is needed, argue William Freer and James Rogers of the Council on Geostrategy.
That doesn't just mean more vessels. It means addressing recruitment and retention to ensure the navy has the personnel it needs, and a clear message to the defence sector that a steady and predictable pipeline of procurement can be expected over the coming decades.
What happened to the Royal Navy?
Long-term complacency about the need to retain hard power in the post-Cold War era; dramatic cutbacks in shipbuilding and support infrastructure for the navy's conventional high-end fighting power; and the expectation – in a series of strategic defence reviews – that the US would underwrite British security, says James Fennell of the Centre for European Policy Analysis.
The UK is in the absurd position of having 50,000 civil servants in its Ministry of Defence, the highest number ever, but a navy numbering only around 20,000, once the Royal Marines are discounted.
It's also hard to overstate how “closely the Treasury is wedded to defence on the cheap”, says Fennell. Spending 2.3% of GDP on defence is grossly inadequate and the “dismal” Cyprus embarrassment should signal the end of this complacent era.
Should Britain spend more on its defence forces?
It's supposed to be. The UK should “restore the strength of our conventional armed forces, fill in vital gaps in our defences and become a home of thriving, high-tech new defence firms”, says William Hague in The Times. That would “give us leverage with those occupants of the White House we can rely on and help us survive the tenures of those we can't”. But despite public pledges, funds are not flowing. Dithering over the Defence Investment Plan has gone on for months, with firms describing the speed at which purchases take place as “glacial”. The government has committed – as part of a Nato agreement – to raise defence spending to 3.5% of GDP by 2035 and has already set out the path to hit 2.6% by 2027. In practice, though, the proportion of national income spent on defence and materiel, stripping out pensions and similar items, is expected to fall next year to 2.13%.
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